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Entropy, though a term from the world of physics, seems an endemic feature of human affairs as well. To resist the inclination to disorder and degeneration, we feel the urge, 
from time to time, to put a new pulse of energy through our organisations and systems. 
Renewal, reform and realignment are the common slogans. Cynics often identify the campaign 
against entropy with the egotisms of new leading personalities who want to put their mark 
on organisations and, indeed, on history. And the cynics are often quite right. But it may also 
be that the newcomers are just sensitive to the entropy problem, even though they misjudge 
the language they use in addressing it. 
Particularly at a time of financial constraint, there are related misjudgements which are just as dangerous. 
Wanting to embrace change, we can so easily misjudge the differences between the fundamental and 
the incidental purposes of an institution. We forget that real value mainly resides in the fundamental. In 
the field of foreign affairs, these problems are familiar and acceleratingly cyclical, almost leaving one to 
fear that a deeper entropy is at work of which these spasms of reform are but painful, clinical symptoms.
Today, impelled by the state of public finances, there is a shift away from the socialist belief that ‘bigger 
government is better government’. Public departments are being cut back. And so, more than ever, it 
is important that we stay calm in recognising the differences between policy, strategy and operations, 
between fundamentals and incidentals. In these circumstances, the government’s determination to 
harness our diplomatic effort to ‘support for business’ is troubling. On a reduced budget, what is to 
become of main diplomatic responsibilities? Are we watching strategy or spasm?
Whatever view we take of the state of our nation, the fundamental purposes of our overseas 
representatives remain remarkably unchanged: to negotiate with foreign governments, to understand 
the dynamics of power behind foreign governments’ policies and to advise HMG on what British policies 
would best promote our own interests. These functions have value if we are to avoid ‘megaphone 
diplomacy’, policies steeped in ignorance or simple short-sightedness. It does not greatly matter 
whether we are in downturn or upswing. The job needs doing. And we kid ourselves, if we think that 
the media, official visits or new slogans will do the job instead. Only the ethos and values of public 
service can offer the government bespoke advice. Others may have important parts to play, clearly. 
But when others put their experience at the service of government, their motives can be variable and 
their reliability is qualified. 
Of course, a small body of men and women able to discharge these diplomatic functions, is an enviable 
asset and many nations used to be jealous of our diplomatic service. Even the policeman questioned 
by an army officer, feeling his way down Whitehall in a war-time black out, ‘Which side is the FO on?’ 
answered, ‘Ours, I hope.’ But the asset can easily be taken for granted. In consequence, our diplomatic 
service has faced a proliferation of tasks and objectives which have had organisational repercussions, 
not least at the expense of the core political work. Locally employed staff at missions have been 
expected to fill gaps in political coverage and to do so without diplomatic immunity. Further afield, 
where we are less well understood or forgiven, this has caused suspicion. In Iran, this ‘more for less’ 
was followed by charges of spying. The rising damp of political correctness and left-marking catch-
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phrases masquerading as policy has helped diminish 
the prestige of our diplomats. The prestige they once 
enjoyed gave them access, influence and credibility 
– advantages in any age.
Returning the FCO to a commitment to its fundamental 
tasks would be mind clearing. It would also make 
space for a more hard headed examination of what 
our interests really are. The gormless smugness of the 
recent National Security Strategy conjures up a world 
suggestible to the Strategy’s recitative of assertions. 
The panglossian agenda does need challenging: for 
the purposes of the diplomatic service, where there is 
little connection with negotiation, good assessment 
and policy advice, tough interrogation should follow. 
It is possible that the FCO should operate on fewer 
resources; but the more important and prior question 
is ‘What should it be doing?’
Our geography and traditions give us special 
advantage in dealing with foreign policy questions. 
Many other states face serious questions about their 
sustainability and importantly their sovereignty. The 
UK is not immune to these issues and has its own 
domestic questions about its union, but our identity 
as an independently minded trading nation is not 
yet threatened. Many contemporary problems lie 
like mist across the international scene, apparently 
not rooted in, or defined by, familiar state structures. 
Even, however, when we try to tackle so-called ‘non-
state actors’, dealing with other governments is 
unavoidable. When we are abroad, we are usually 
on somebody else’s turf, despite the elisions 
of globalisation.
The thematic imperative remains that we have to be 
good at dealing with others, with people overseas 
and especially their governments. And this is best 
done overseas where we may better understand the 
local drivers which are working for, or against, our 
own interest. This is work which requires experience 
and some specialisation. 
Understanding what is going on in the world is a 
prerequisite for having an idea of what we should 
like to be in the world. Existential angst about our 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council or our 
international military profile subtly proposes that 
these large questions are entirely for us to decide. In 
fact, debating society motions make bad options for 
foreign policy. A degree of predictability is important 
to being a reliable partner in international affairs, as 
it is to being a formidable opponent. Only time will 
tell whether the idea in the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review of An Adaptable Posture captures 
the necessary reassuring, or minatory, tone. 
At deeper levels there is more than enough going 
on which should make us cautious about showy 
initiatives. Anybody who can remember the Cold 
War is struck by the irretrievability of that world 
which formed us. This is no cause for nostalgia, but 
a reminder of the difficulty we have now in reading 
the signs of the times, not least in the relationships 
between societies and their governments. The puzzling 
but radical changes in the make-up and behaviours 
of our own society are very present overseas as well. 
The empirical evidence of the paradox of political 
torpor and rapid social development suggests that 
there is a general problem of lack of vision ahead. 
Extremists are benefitting from the muddle and may 
well be enduring adversaries abroad, but the middle 
ground is silent. The lull in ideological conflict has 
left us curiously inarticulate. 
Thus the future of the EU and of NATO remains 
opaque. The Middle East and Far East offer few 
indications of how their regimes will cope with 
demographic change. The so-called BRIC countries, 
favourites in some crude economic contest, do not 
tell us how their political systems will adapt to serve 
the development they want, or, if they do not, how 
their political systems will stay on top of the ferment. 
The United States is a new source of uncertainty, 
troubled by its riddles of isolationist, exceptionalist 
and interventionist moods. The underlying political 
ennui in the world was brought home to us in 
the early attempts to do something about climate 
change. Policy which is mainly optative or aspirational, 
sounds like a shepherd’s boy whistling to keep himself 
company at night. Only the wolves benefit - they 
have ears to hear. 
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Seeing the change and uncertainty which characterise 
our world today suggests that a shrewd government 
will be cautious. Not all issues in the world are 
amenable to government statements or policy 
initiatives. Getting our diplomatic resources in good 
repair and clear about their primary responsibilities 
will better enable us to make sense of events, be they 
signalling single swallows or black swans. 
The idea of a national security organisation offers 
a technique for bringing together the streams of 
knowledge and experience in government to take 
a critical overview of what is to be done. Gone are 
the days when national security questions were the 
preserve of a ‘peaked capped’ culture of military and 
security officials. Today, global health, migration, 
unemployment and religious convictions, energy and 
food security, financial regulation and many others 
touch directly on our competitiveness and welfare, 
on the home and overseas dimensions of our national 
security. Coherence is the salient requirement in 
defining our interests and the strategic choices open 
to us. To consider them, we need optics which can 
capture both context and focus. 
So the new project of a National Security Council 
does deserve sustained support. It will not be easy 
– for them or for us. Patience is already tested by 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review and its 
muddle about the meanings of ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. 
Bureaucratic interests and prejudices, the calibre 
of ministers and Treasury officials each conspire to 
preserve the defended and enclavist attitudes of 
departments. Work to support the NSC will face 
many unintended consequences, like those which 
followed the campaigns for ‘joined up government’ 
in recent years. There will be a risk of duplication 
and of the NSC’s interfering in what should properly 
be the responsibilities of individual ministers. The 
overlap between foreign policy and overseas aid will 
continue to cause tension. Enormous pressure will 
bear down on those sitting on the council. Diffident 
about wisdom, they may retreat into searches for 
more data, a proliferation of follow-up. The challenge 
of settling for the best they can do at the time, will 
demand courage. 
No less a challenge will be submitting the elite self-
confidence of top politicians and officials to the 
authority of parliament. A parliamentary committee, 
drawn from both houses, has to underpin the 
confidence we need to have, in the ultimate decisions 
the government takes. This should also both supply 
some restraint on ministerial enthusiasms and uphold 
the public interest in the face of an official tendency 
to fix. The committee should insist on an audit of 
the capabilities needed to support policy, strategy 
and operations. 
Despite these problems, the NSC offers the chance 
to seek efficiency through greater conductivity at 
the most senior level. This sounds like dealing with 
entropy again - it is a fundamental problem. But 
it is heartening that the government seems ready 
to clean up the spaghetti wiring of Cabinet Office 
processes for dealing with national security problems. 
We must hope that the lessons of the last decade 
and our hopes for the new one will encourage 
officials to give the change a chance. A change of 
approach is needed. And if it promotes a hard re-
engagement with fundamental issues, then hope 
may be justified. ■
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